Equity Weighting and the Marginal Damage Costs of Climate Change by David Anthoff et al.
This paper can be downloaded without charge at: 
 
The Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Note di Lavoro Series Index: 
http://www.feem.it/Feem/Pub/Publications/WPapers/default.htm 
  







The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the position of 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 




Equity Weighting and the Marginal 
Damage Costs of Climate Change 
David Anthoff, Cameron Hepburn  
and Richard S.J. Tol  














CCMP – Climate Change Modelling and Policy 
 
 
David Anthoff, International Max Planck Research School on Earth System Modelling, Hamburg 
and Research Unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University and Centre for Marine 
and Atmospheric Science, Hamburg 
Cameron Hepburn, St Hugh's College, University of Oxford, Oxford 
Richard S.J. Tol, Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin, Research Unit Sustainability and 
Global Change, Hamburg University and Centre for Marine and Atmospheric Science, Hamburg, 
Institute for Environmental Studies, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam and Engineering and  





Equity Weighting and the Marginal Damage Costs of Climate Change 
Summary 
Climate change would impact different countries differently, and different countries have 
different levels of development. Equity-weighted estimates of the (marginal) impact of 
greenhouse gas emissions reflect these differences. Equity-weighted estimates of the 
marginal damage cost of carbon dioxide emissions are substantially higher than estimates 
without equity-weights; equity-weights may also change the sign of the social cost 
estimates. Equity weights need to be normalised. Our estimates differ by two orders of 
magnitude depending on the region  of normalisation. A discounting error of equity 
weighted social cost of carbon estimates in earlier work (Tol, Energy Journal, 1999), led to 
an error of a factor two. Equity-weighted estimates are sensitive to the resolution of the 
impact estimates. Depending on the assumed intra-regional income distribution, estimates 
may be more than twice as high if national rather than regional impacts are aggregated. The 
assumed scenario is important too, not only because different scenarios have different 
emissions and hence warming, but also because different scenarios have different income 
differences, different growth rates, and different vulnerabilities. Because of this, variations 
in the assumed inequity aversion have little effect on the marginal damage cost in some 
scenarios, and a large effect in other scenarios. 
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1.  Introduction 
Impacts  from  climate  change  will  be  spread  across  time  and  space.  The  search  for 
economically efficient mitigation and adaptation strategies is one of the key challenges for 
today‘s policy makers. Looking for an efficient greenhouse gas emission profile from the 
perspective of a global decision maker requires careful consideration of the socio-economic 
environments  that will bear the impacts  of  climate change.  One particular concern  is  the 
widely  disparate  incomes  of  the  people  affected.  Economic  theory  assumes  a  declining 
marginal  utility  of  consumption,  i.e.  the  same  absolute  consumption  change  results  in  a 
smaller welfare change for a rich person than a poor person. Incorporating this theoretical 
model into climate change impact models has a significant effect on efficient policy choices 
for a global decision maker. 
This  paper  presents  new  results  from  FUND,  an  integrated  assessment  model,  that  takes 
different income levels in different world regions and at different times into account when 
calculating marginal damage figures for greenhouse gas emissions. A new theoretical model 
is presented that allows the incorporation of income level data that is obtained at a finer grid 
than the one used in  previous versions  of  FUND. Sensitivity to  a key  ethical  parameter, 
inequality aversion, is tested as well. A discussion of the theoretical interaction of the growth 
component of the social discount rate and equity weights as described in the literature is 
presented in the theoretical section. In addition to the discussion of the interaction of the 
social  discount  rate with  equity weights,  it is  argued that social  cost  of carbon  estimates 
should be normalized with the marginal utility of consumption of a specific region, if the 
marginal damage costs are later to be used in a cost-benefit analysis for projects in that region. 
All marginal damage figures are calculated for five different socio-economic development 
scenarios in order to test sensitivity to parameters like population and GDP growth.   3 
The  article  is  structured  into  a  discussion  of  the  previous  literature,  the  presentation  and 
development of the theoretical model, the presentation of key results from using FUND, the 
numerical model, and finally a discussion of the findings and its consequences on policy 
choices. 
2.  Previous literature 
There are a number of cost-benefit models that calculate the so-called ‗social cost of carbon‘, 
which  generally  refers  to  the  expected  present  value  damage  of  a  (metric)  tonne  of  CO2 
emissions along a particular path (e.g. business-as-usual). Examples include Nordhaus and 
Boyer (1999), Cline (1992), Fankhauser (1995), Tol (1997) and Hope (2003). A number of 
papers have dealt specifically with the question of equity weighting in relation to calculations 
of the social cost of carbon. Pearce, Cline et al. (1996) brought forward the idea that equity 
weights  should  be  used  when  calculating  the  social  cost  of  carbon.  More  recently,  Stern 
(2006, p. 159) also argued that global damage estimates ought to be based on a framework 
similar to the one used in this paper, but did not actually use it in its calculations, due to time 
constraints.  Fankhauser,  Tol  et  al.  (1997)  and  Pearce  (2003)  presented  equity  weighting 
corrected social  cost  of carbon estimates,  but  their results  may be misleading, as  will be 
argued in this paper. Azar and Sterner (1996) and Azar (1999) present the most complete 
theoretical  treatment  of  equity  weights  in  the  context  of  climate  change.  However,  the 
quantitative results in these papers are based on a stylised two region model, and hence do not 
provide  reliable  estimates  of  global  damages.  Shiell  (2003)  calculates  optimal  global 
greenhouse gas emissions under various ethical assumptions, including different weights for 
different world regions. 
This paper only investigates a utilitarian social welfare function. Other ethical positions have 
been applied to  climate change  as  well, for  a  discussion see Tol  (2001), Tol  (2002) and 
Kemfert and Tol (2002).  The question of distributional weights has also been discussed in   4 
more general terms previously.  Harberger (1978) and the discussion that followed (Harberger 
1980; Layard 1980; Squire 1980) looked at distributional weights in the context of commodity 
taxation, investment projects and optimal income taxation. Before using the social cost of 
carbon figures calculated in this paper to design policy instruments, similar analysis ought to 
be conducted on the effects of the weights used in this paper on the policy instrument in 
question.  More  recently  Johansson-Stenman  (2005)  concluded  that  the  question  whether 
distributional weights ought to be used in cost-benefit analysis cannot be answered in general, 
but should rather be informed by the specific circumstances of the proposed project or policy 
instrument. 
Boadway (1976) examines a welfare criterion that not only takes efficiency but also equity 
into consideration. A key feature of his solution is that no detailed knowledge of winners and 
losers  is  needed for this  criterion  to  work, but  rather taking into account  the distribution 
characteristics of goods. Of course, in the case of climate change, such an indirect approach is 
not needed: Integrated assessment models like FUND calculate damages per world region, 
which  allows  fairly  good  identification  of  income  characteristics  of  the  losers  of  global 
warming. 
Mirrlees (1978) has a short section on welfare weights and externalities, arguing that in the 
case  of  e.g.  environmental  externalities  weights  ought  to  be  used  in  social  cost-benefit 
analysis. At the same time he points out two problems one might encounter: Estimated prices 
for non-market goods might already reflect income distribution and therefore conflict with 
distributional weights. And secondly, a regulator might set unwanted incentives when using 
welfare  weights  in  cost-benefit  analysis.  One  could  for  example  imagine  a  particularly 
backwards region that would be favoured when appraising social projects because income in 
that region is very low. Instead of encouraging people to leave that region, policy determined 
by  regional  income  levels  might  create  incentives  to  stay  at  a  hostile  place.  Given  the   5 
magnitude of climate change, the latter warning seems outside the realm of economic analysis 
and a more appropriate question for other disciplines. 
3.  Theoretical model 
Damages caused by the emission of a (metric) tonne of carbon today are spread across time 
and space. In order to calculate the marginal damage of greenhouse gas emissions today all 
damages that are caused by those emissions need to be added up. Two theoretical ideas are 
considered  in  the  aggregation  of  damages  in  this  paper.  First,  the  standard  economic 
assumption of diminishing marginal utility implies that the same monetary damage causes 
more grief to a poor than a rich person. This step is often called ―equity weighting‖ of costs 
and benefits. Second, damages at different times need to be discounted to determine their 
respective net present values.  There are two components to discounting. The first is that 
consumption in the future is likely to be higher than consumption today (even accounting for 
climate impacts), so diminishing marginal utility implies that the same monetary damage will 
cause less grief in the future.  The second is that we might wish to place a lower weight on 
utility in the future, to account for social impatience or extinction risk, which is specified by a 
pure rate of time preference (or ‗utility discount rate‘). 
This paper determines discounted and equity-weighted estimates of climate change damages. 
The combination of discounting and equity weighting needs to be done with care, since the 
two concepts overlap in their theoretical justification. 
3.1.  The social welfare function 
The  intuition  that  individual  marginal  utility  of  consumption  is  declining  with  increasing 
consumption c can be expressed by an iso-elastic utility function: 










  (1)   6 
ε is commonly referred to as the consumption elasticity of marginal utility.  For decisions 
under  uncertainty,  ε  is  also  the  individual  coefficient  of  relative  risk  aversion.  On  the 
assumption that individuals have a utility function like (1), the value of ε can be found by 
empirical research: one can infer from behaviour how averse individuals are to reductions in 
consumption, or to risk.
1   
Assuming that the social welfare function (SWF) is individualistic, nondecreasing, symmetric 
and additive (see Cowell and Gardiner 1999 for an excellent discussion), the SWF can be 
written as 
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where    Cx is consumption of agent x and n is the population size. 
Note that the value of ε also impacts how averse we are to inequality in consumption. For 
instance, ε = 0 corresponds to inequality neutrality, i.e. there is no social benefit to reducing 
consumption inequality, because an absolute change in consumption counts the same, whether 
it befalls the rich or the poor. In contrast, for ε→∞, achieving equality dominates any other 
objective such as raising general consumption levels; this is because a change in consumption 
of the poorest member of society always dominates consumption changes of others. In other 
words, ε→∞ implies that the effective social welfare function is equivalent to a Rawlsian 
SWF,  such  that      min W U C i    .  Values  between  those  two  extremes  correspond  to 
ethical positions with various degrees of inequality aversion. If ε=1 so that    log U c c  , for 
instance, relative changes in consumption receive equal weight. 
It  is  crucial  to  understand  the  connection  between  the  elasticity  of  marginal  utility  and 
inequality  aversion.  If  marginal  utility  did  not  decline  with  increased  wealth  levels  the 
motivation for aversion to inequality would be much weaker.  An individual utility function 
with a constant marginal utility implies that a given change in consumption always has the   7 
same effect on a person, irrespectively of whether that person is rich or poor. At the same 
time, there is no reason to assume that our aversion to inequality should simply be specified 
by the consumption elasticity of marginal utility. While the results from empirical tests of the 
consumption  elasticity  of  marginal  utility  are  interesting  and  certainly  relevant  in  the 
discussion of an appropriate level of social inequality aversion, there is no logical reason that 
the inequality aversion value must equal our best estimate of the consumption elasticity of 
marginal utility – Fankhauser et al. (1997) use a more general version of (2) that allows risk 
and inequity aversion to deviate. Others have argued that society‘s ethical preferences can be 
discovered by looking at the policies in place. Looking at the tax code allows one to reveal an 
implicit  value  for  the  inequality  aversion  used  at  a  particular  time  (Cowell  and  Gardiner 
1999). Examining levels of foreign aid might reveal implicit aversion to inequality between 
nations. There are very good reasons to argue that climate change policy should be consistent 
with  other  government  policies  –  the  level  of  inequality  aversion  used  in  climate  policy 
should  be  consistent  with  that  revealed  by  the  tax  code  and  foreign  aid  decisions. 
Nevertheless, this conclusion is not a logical necessity. One could easily imagine a situation 
with a tax code that is unfair – mirroring this would be questionable. It is almost impossible to 
determine the appropriate level of inequality aversion (and hence ε in this paper), without 
some discussion of the relevant ethics. 
3.2.  Dynamic aggregation 
When looking at a dynamic setting, i.e. one where consumption flows are spread across time, 
discounting of future consumption is necessary. The traditional Ramsey-type optimal growth 
model has two components determining the weights for future consumption: again, future 
consumption is converted into some measure of utility by a social utility function; secondly 
that utility is weighted with an exponentially decreasing time preference factor. Since the 
SWF that was developed in the previous section already employs an iso-elastic social utility   8 
function, the only thing left in order to extend it into the dynamic setting is the addition of the 
time preference factor: 
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In  this  equation n(t)  is  the number of people alive at  time  t,  T  is  the  time period under 
consideration,
2 ρ is the pure rate of time preference and    , C s j  is the consumption of agent j 
at time s. 
Differentiation of (3) with respect to a consumption change of agent i at time t gives marginal 
social welfare of consumption: 
 









  (4) 
3.3.  Marginal damage cost of carbon dioxide 
The social cost of carbon is commonly specified as the social cost of an incremental emission 
of a greenhouse gas today. Because greenhouse gases are long-lived, the damages caused by a 
marginal emission will manifest themselves as a change in consumption at every future point 
in time t, for each of the total number of people n(t) living at that time. Consumption therefore 
depends on the emission path over time: 
    ,, C s j E v     (5) 
where    Ev is the emission of greenhouse gas at time v<s and C is consumption of individual 
j at time s for a given emission scenario E. 
The marginal change in consumption  D, or damage, for  an individual  i at  time  t from  a 
marginal change in emissions at time r therefore is 
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In order to calculate the total change in social welfare from a marginal change of emissions at 
time r, each individual damage D needs to be converted into social utility by multiplying it 
with the appropriate marginal social welfare as calculated in (4), and then summing over time 
and individuals: 
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Note that equation (7) rests upon the assumption that we are calculating a marginal change in 
emissions.  Under a non-marginal change, such as radical shifts in global climate policy, the 
approximation underlying (7) is likely to be inapplicable.  Finally, using (4) gives 
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  Vr therefore is the marginal change in net present social welfare from a marginal change in 
emissions at time r. 
3.4.  Monetisation 
Often, attempts to calculate damages from climate change are done in order to use them in 
cost-benefit analysis. The value obtained by (8) can be used directly in a cost-benefit analysis 
that is done with social utility as the metric. Obviously the same weights employed in the 
calculation of the marginal social utility loss of greenhouse gas emissions should also be 
applied to any other change in consumption levels – cost or benefit – that is considered in the 
particular cost-benefit analysis. 
While there is no flaw to this approach, it is not very convenient. The extra step of ensuring 
that  all  consumption  changes  under  consideration  are  weighted  with  the  same  weighting 
scheme might sometimes be hard to achieve, particularly when other consumption changes 
are only available in an aggregate form. Ideally, one would present the social cost of carbon in   10 
a metric that allows direct comparability with other consumption changes, instead of social 
utility changes. 
Normalising the result obtained in (8) using the marginal social utility of consumption today 
(t=0) of a particular agent x results in 
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which equals 
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Note that V in (8) is measured in utility, whereas Vx in (10) is measured in money. Since the 
normalisation is just a multiplication of all costs and benefits by a positive constant, the set of 
policies that passes a cost-benefit analysis before and after the normalisation is identical. But 
if the social cost of carbon is only to be compared to other consumption changes    , MC t x  
that affect agent  x, the net present value of those changes reduces to 
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Assuming  growth  in  consumptio n  is  constant  at  rate  g,  it  follows 
that       0, , 1
t
C x C t x g

   and        0, , 1
t C x C t x g
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
    .  Substituting  to  (11) 
yields the standard equation for calculating the net present value for consumption changes 
over time for agent  x. Thus, normalisation with the marginal utility of consumption of agent 
x allows direct comparison of the social cost of carbon figure with consumption changes for 
that agent that are discounted into their net present value equivalents. 
It  is  therefore  suggested  that  marginal  damage  figures  from  climate  change  should  be 
normalized  with  the  marginal  utility  of  consumption  of  the  agent  (or  marginal  utility  of 
average consumption of a region) that is engaging in a cost-benefit analysis, since this will   11 
allow direct comparison with other costs and benefits to that agent. Note, however, that if this 
agent is any other than the global social planner, other agents‘ damages are evaluated as if 
they fell on oneself, a Kantian perspective. 
3.5.  Previous methods 
Previously, equity weighted marginal damage figures have been calculated with FUND (Tol 
1999),
3 for which a different approach was used. For every year t, an equity weight was 
calculated for every agent i:
4 








  (12) 
where    W Ct  is average per capita income of the world at time t. 
In addition, a discount factor was calculated for every individual i at time t: 












  (13) 
Both  the  equity  weight  and  the  social  discount  factor  were  then  applied  to  the  marginal 
damage for each region over time, before they were aggregated: 
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Note that there are two differences betwee n (14) and (11). Firstly, normalisation is with the 
utility of the world average agent in (14) and with any agent in (11). Secondly, normalisation 
is with present utility in (11) and with current utility in  (14). That is, in (11), damages are 
evaluated as if they fell on today‘s income distribution. In (14), that assumption is not there, 
as  the  damage  is  monetised  based  on  the  future  income  distribution.  However,  (14)  is 
incorrect. If current damages are translated to the equity-weighted global average, then the 
global average discount rate should be used, and not the regional discount rate as in (14).   12 
3.6.  Spatial resolution 
None of the integrated assessment models used to understand climate change impacts works 
on  an  individual  agent  resolution.  Instead,  impacts  are  calculated  separately  for  different 
world regions. FUND, for example, calculates impacts for 16 world regions; others operate on 
an even coarser grid. 
In  order  to  accommodate  this  fact,  (10)  needs  to  be  changed  such  that  instead  of  using 
  ,, D t i r  (i.e. the damage function that operates on an individual agent basis), a regional 
damage function    ,, R D t i r  is used that returns the damage for the whole region i at time t for 
a marginal change of emissions at time r.  Instead of using individual consumption levels for 
the social utility function, average per capita consumption levels    , R C t i  for region i need to 
be used. Finally, the monetisation is done relatively to a specific region  x, that is with the 
average marginal social utility of consumption of region  x: 
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Here n is the number of regions considered. In FUND, n = 16.  
One unfortunate consequence of (15) is that the equity weighting part of the social utility 
function will diverge from the correct weight with a decrease in spatial scale (Fankhauser, Tol 
et al. 1997). In contrast to (10), which is theoretically correct, (15) only takes into account 
inequalities in consumption levels between regions, while different consumption levels within 
regions are ignored. This is a pity, because data about consumption levels are available at a 
more detailed level — average per capita income levels are known minimally at a national 
level so that ideally that knowledge should be taken into account when calculating the social 
cost of carbon.   13 
3.7.  Aggregation coefficient 
Looking at only one region j at time t for the moment, and assuming that not only the average 
consumption levels for its countries, but also detailed damage information on a per country 
basis is available, the following is true: 
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Here nj is the number of countries in region j.    , N D t i  is the damage and    , N C t i  is the 
average consumption in country i at time t. 
One can assume that the damage to each country within that region is a fraction of the total 
damage    , R D t j  of the region j: 
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 Therefore the welfare change for that region amounts to 
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Assuming that damages are uniformly distributed to all individuals in region j is captured as 
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Where    , N P t i  is the population size of nation i at time t, and    , R P t j  is the total population 






P t j P t i

 . The average per capita consumption    , N C t i  of country 
i is defined as 
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Where    , N C t i  is the total consumption of nation i. Substituting (19) and (20) into (18) gives   14 
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This is equivalent to 
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Dividing this by the damage of the region that is weighted with the average marginal social 
utility of that region and the time preference factor gives a coefficient that can be applied to 
weighted, regional damage figures: 
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  , E t j  is a weight for region j at time t that corrects to some degree the error introduced by 
calculating average consumption levels at the regional level, if more detailed information is 
available. At least for the present, all data required to calculate this coefficient is available, 
namely population and income figures on a national level. 
Putting  this  aggregation  coefficient  into  (15)  gives  the  final  equation  that  allows  one  to 
calculate  the  marginal  damage  of  greenhouse  gas  emissions,  normalised  to  average 
consumption of region x: 
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4.  Results 
4.1.  The model 
This  paper  uses  version  2.8  of  the  Climate  Framework  for  Uncertainty,  Negotiation  and 
Distribution (FUND). Version 2.8 of FUND corresponds to version 1.6, described and applied   15 
by  Tol  (1999,  2001,  2002a),  except  for  the  impact  module,  which  is  described  by  Tol 
(2002b,c) and updated by Link and Tol (2004). A further difference is that the current version 
of the model distinguishes 16 instead of 9 regions.
5 Readers familiar with FUND can skip this 
section. 
Essentially, FUND consists of a set of exogenous scenarios and endogenous perturbations. 
The model distinguishes 16 major regions of the world, viz. the United States of America, 
Canada, Western Europe, Japan and South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, Central and 
Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, the Middle East, Central America, South America, 
South  Asia,  Southeast  Asia,  China,  North  Africa,  Sub-Saharan  Africa,  and  Small  Island 
States. The model runs from 1950 to 2300 in time steps of one year. The prime reason for 
starting in 1950 is to initialize the climate change impact module. In FUND, the impacts of 
climate change are assumed to depend on the impact of the previous year, this way reflecting 
the process of adjustment to climate change. Because the initial values to be used for the year 
1950 cannot be approximated very well, both physical and monetized impacts of climate 
change tend to be misrepresented in the first few decades of the model runs. The 22
nd and 23
rd 
centuries are included to account for the fact that climate change does not stop in 2100. 
The period of 1950-1990 is used for the calibration of the model, which is based on the 
IMAGE 100-year database (Batjes & Goldewijk, 1994). The period 1990-2000 is based on 
observations (WRI, 2000). The climate scenarios for the period 2010-2100 are based on the 
EMF14 Standardized Scenario, which lies somewhere in between IS92a and IS92f (Leggett, 
Pepper et al. 1992). The 2000-2010 period is interpolated from the immediate past, and the 
period 2100-2300 extrapolated. 
The scenarios are defined by the rates of population growth, economic growth, autonomous 
energy  efficiency  improvements  as  well  as  the  rate  of  decarbonisation  of  the  energy  use 
(autonomous carbon efficiency improvements), and emissions of carbon dioxide from land 
use change, methane and nitrous oxide. The scenarios of economic and population growth are   16 
perturbed by the impact of climatic change. Population  decreases  with  increasing climate 
change related deaths that result from changes in heat stress, cold stress, malaria, and tropical 
cyclones.  Heat  and  cold  stress  are  assumed  to  have  an  effect  only  on  the  elderly,  non-
reproductive population. In contrast, the other sources of mortality also affect the number of 
births. Heat stress only affects the urban population. The share of the urban population among 
the  total  population  is  based  on  the  World  Resources  Databases  (WRI,  2000).  It  is 
extrapolated based on the statistical relationship between urbanization and per-capita income, 
which are estimated from a cross-section of countries in 1995. Climate-induced migration 
between the regions of the world also causes the population sizes to change. Immigrants are 
assumed to assimilate immediately and completely with the respective host population. 
The tangible impacts are dead-weight losses to the economy. Consumption and investment are 
reduced without changing the savings rate. As a result, climate change reduces long-term 
economic growth, although consumption is particularly affected in the short-term. Economic 
growth is also reduced by carbon dioxide abatement measures. The energy intensity of the 
economy and the carbon intensity of the energy supply autonomously decrease over time. 
This process can be accelerated by abatement policies, an option not considered in this paper. 
The endogenous parts of FUND consist of the atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, 
methane  and  nitrous  oxide,  the  global  mean  temperature,  the  impact  of  carbon  dioxide 
emission reductions on the economy and on emissions, and the impact of the damages to the 
economy and the population caused by climate change. Methane and nitrous oxide are taken 
up in  the atmosphere, and then geometrically depleted. The atmospheric concentration of 
carbon  dioxide,  measured  in  parts  per  million  by  volume,  is  represented  by  the  five-box 
model of Maier-Reimer and Hasselmann (1987). Its parameters are taken from Hammitt et al. 
(1992). The model also contains sulphur emissions (Tol, forthcoming). 
The  radiative  forcing  of  carbon  dioxide,  methane,  nitrous  oxide  and  sulphur  aerosols  is 
determined based on Shine et al. (1990). The global mean temperature T is governed by a   17 
geometric build-up to its equilibrium (determined by the radiative forcing RF), with a half-life 
of 50 years. In the base case, the global mean temperature rises in equilibrium by 2.5°C for a 
doubling of carbon dioxide equivalents. Regional temperature follows from multiplying the 
global mean temperature by a fixed factor, which corresponds to the spatial climate change 
pattern averaged over 14 GCMs (Mendelsohn et al., 2000). The global mean sea level is also 
geometric, with  its  equilibrium level determined by the temperature and a half-life of 50 
years.  Both  temperature  and  sea  level  are  calibrated  to  correspond  to  the  best  guess 
temperature and sea level for the IS92a scenario of Kattenberg et al. (1996). 
The  climate  impact  module,  based  on  Tol  (2002b,c)  includes  the  following  categories: 
agriculture, forestry, sea level rise, cardiovascular and respiratory disorders related to cold and 
heat  stress,  malaria,  dengue  fever,  schistosomiasis,  diarrhoea,  energy  consumption,  water 
resources, and unmanaged ecosystems. Climate change related damages can be attributed to 
either the rate of change (benchmarked at 0.04°C/yr) or the level of change (benchmarked at 
1.0°C). Damages from the rate of temperature change slowly fade, reflecting adaptation (cf. 
Tol, 2002c). 
People can die prematurely due to temperature stress or vector-borne diseases, or they can 
migrate  because  of  sea  level  rise.  Like  all  impacts  of  climate  change,  these  effects  are 
monetized. The value of a statistical life is set to be 200 times the annual per capita income. 
The resulting value of a statistical life lies in the middle of the observed range of values in the 
literature (cf. Cline, 1992). The value of emigration is set to be 3 times the per capita income 
(Tol, 1995, 1996), the value of immigration is 40 per cent of the per capita income in the host 
region  (Cline,  1992).  Losses  of  dryland  and  wetlands  due  to  sea  level  rise  are  modelled 
explicitly. The monetary value of a loss of one square kilometre of dryland was on average $4 
million in OECD countries in 1990 (cf. Fankhauser, 1994). Dryland value is assumed to be 
proportional to GDP per square kilometre. Wetland losses are valued at $2 million per square 
kilometre on average in the OECD in 1990 (cf. Fankhauser, 1994). The wetland value is   18 
assumed to have logistic relation to per capita income. Coastal protection is based on cost-
benefit analysis, including the value of additional wetland lost due to the construction of dikes 
and subsequent coastal squeeze. 
Other impact  categories, such as  agriculture, forestry, energy, water,  and ecosystems,  are 
directly expressed in monetary values without an intermediate layer of impacts measured in 
their  ‗natural‘  units  (cf.  Tol,  2002b).  Impacts  of  climate  change  on  energy  consumption, 
agriculture, and cardiovascular and respiratory diseases explicitly recognize that there is a 
climatic optimum, which is determined by a variety of factors, including plant physiology and 
the behaviour of farmers. Impacts are positive or negative depending on whether the actual 
climate conditions are moving closer to or away from that optimum climate. Impacts are 
larger  if  the  initial  climate  conditions  are  further  away  from  the  optimum  climate.  The 
optimum climate is of importance with regard to the potential impacts. The actual impacts lag 
behind the potential impacts, depending on the speed of adaptation. The impacts of not being 
fully adapted to new climate conditions are always negative (cf. Tol, 2002c). 
The  impacts  of  climate  change  on  coastal  zones,  forestry,  unmanaged  ecosystems,  water 
resources, diarrhoea malaria, dengue fever, and schistosomiasis are modelled as simple power 
functions.  Impacts  are  either  negative  or  positive,  and  they  do  not  change  sign  (cf.  Tol, 
2002c). 
Vulnerability  to  climate  change  changes  with  population  growth,  economic  growth,  and 
technological progress. Some systems are expected to become more vulnerable, such as water 
resources  (with  population  growth),  heat-related  disorders  (with  urbanization),  and 
ecosystems  and  health  (with  higher  per  capita  incomes).  Other  systems  are  projected  to 
become  less  vulnerable,  such  as  energy  consumption  (with  technological  progress), 
agriculture  (with economic growth)  and vector-  and  water-borne diseases  (with improved 
health care) (cf. Tol, 2002c).   19 
FUND also includes instruments for and costs of reducing the emissions of carbon dioxide, 
methane, and nitrous oxide. It can perform cost-benefit analysis, cost-effectiveness analysis, 
and equity analysis. These parts of the model are not used in this paper. 
4.2.  Scenarios 
The  theoretical  model  described  in  the  previous  section  has  been  used  to  calculate  the 
marginal damage per ton of carbon emitted within the period 2000-2010 with the integrated 
assessment  model  FUND.  Results  for  FUND  are  presented  for  five  different  exogenous 
scenarios. Four of those are based on work by the IPCC (Nakicenovic and Swart 2000) and 
one – the default scenario for FUND – was developed by Tol (1999). The default scenario is 
very close to the EMF Standardised Scenario, which lies somewhere in between IS92a and 
IS92f (Leggett, Pepper et al. 1992). All five scenarios have been extrapolated to the year 
2300.  Two  aspects  of  the  scenarios  are  of  special  importance  in  the  context  of  equity 
weighting,  namely,  population  growth  and  economic  development.  They  are  of  great 
consequence because they directly drive the equity weights derived for each region and year. 
Figure 1 and 2 show population and per capita income development for the full time period of 
FUND for the scenarios used. 
FUND's default scenario assumes a continuous population growth coupled with moderate per 
capita income growth. It is generally very similar to scenario B2. Both scenarios feature less 
rapid and more diverse technological change than some of the other scenarios. B1 has the 
lowest population of all scenarios. Population peaks at around 2050 and steadily declines 
thereafter. At the same time, strong economic growth happens all around the world, mainly in 
service industries. This scenario also assumes great strides in energy efficiency in all sectors 
and reductions in material intensity. A1b has even higher economic growth than B1. A2 has 
the lowest economic growth (Nakicenovic and Swart 2000). 
4.3.  Results   20 
Table 1 shows the baseline figures for these five scenarios. Results are shown for different 
pure rate of time preference values. While some philosophers and economists argue in favour 
of a pure rate of time preference of 0% (Broome 1992; Cline 2004), the general consensus in 
the literature supports higher rates (Arrow, Cline et al. 1996; Portney and Weyant 1999). The 
0%  numbers  are  nevertheless  presented  here.  By  comparing  the  various  equity  weighted 
numbers that are calculated with the 0% pure rate of time preference, one can have an isolated 
look at the effect the different marginal social utility functions have on the results, i.e. what 
effect the different equity weighting schemes have by themselves. This is helpful since the 
interaction between time preference discounting and equity weighting is neither linear nor 
predictable (see Tol, 2002, and below). 
The  unweighted  numbers  are  discounted  using  the  social  discounting  methodology,  so 
consumption level changes over time are taken into account on a per region basis but not 
between regions. 
Table  2  presents  the  basic  equity  weighted  set  of  marginal  damage  figures  for  marginal 
carbon  emissions.  The  numbers  are  normalised  with  average  US  marginal  utility  of 
consumption for the year 2000. This is an arbitrary choice and others have presented equity 
weighted  climate  change  damage  figures  that  are  normalised  with  marginal  utility  of 
optimally distributed consumption (Fankhauser, Tol et al. 1997; Cline 2004). It is important to 
note that different choices do not amount to different optimal emission strategies or change 
any cost-benefit analysis in a utilitarian framework as used for this paper. The choice of US 
marginal utility makes the consequences equity weighting would have for US policy very 
clear since US mitigation costs need only to be discounted in order to be comparable to these 
results. Table 3 presents equity weighted damage figures that are calculated using the method 
employed in Tol (1999)
6 – see Equation (14). Table 4 shows equity weighted results that are 
normalised with per capita income of the other regions of FUND. While Table 4 shows the 
importance of the choice of the normalisation region, the difference between the numbers in   21 
Table 3 and those in Table 4 that are normalised with world average per capita consumption is 
significant in its own right. The explanation for the latter is to be found in the change in the 
way the equity weights are calculated. 
If one only considers the pure rate of time preference of 0%, one could get the impression 
from Table 1 and 2 that introducing equity weights produces a roughly linear increase in 
marginal damage figures, for US calibrated figures in the range of 10-15 times the original 
number. But with a pure rate of time preference of 3%, the effect of equity weighting depends 
largely on the base scenario used. While FUND predicts benefits for all five scenarios for a 
pure rate of time preference of 3%, equity weighting sometimes increases those benefits (A1b, 
B1 and B2) while it decreases benefits in others (FUND) and changes the results from benefit 
to damage in A2. 
The weights given to different world regions at different times, based only on the different 
consumption levels, are shown in Figure 3. Note that the pure rate of time preference is 0%, 
so  Figure  3  reflects  only  the  impact  of  the  marginal  utility  of  consumption  weight.  One 
striking feature is that Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) gets significantly higher weights throughout 
the whole time period under consideration, while other regions slowly narrow the differences 
over time. With higher pure rates of time preference, the fact that consumption differences do 
not align in the very far future has less and less weight on the overall result.  
Figure 4 disaggregates the marginal damage figure for scenario A2 and a pure rate of time 
preference of 3% by region for the time period from today until 2300. It can be seen that the 
relatively small damages in SSA get a very high weight, even with the high pure rate of time 
preference of 3%. 
4.4.  Regional income inequality correction 
The  data  presented  so  far  only  take  into  consideration  differences  in  average  per  capita 
income of the 16 regions of FUND. Income inequalities within regions are ignored. Table 5   22 
presents  equity  weighted  marginal  damage  figures  that  are  corrected  with  an  aggregation 
coefficient as described in Section 3.7. The figures are based on the SRES A1B scenario. The 
aggregation coefficient for the year 2000 is calculated from average per capita income figures 
at  the  national  level.  Note  that  this  affects  different  regions  differently.  Western  Europe 
consists of many countries, but the regions ―USA‖ and ―Canada‖ are a single country. Intra-
country  income  differences  are  ignored.  Three  different  scenarios  for  the  aggregation 
coefficient over time are presented. 
The first scenario assumes no change in income distribution within each region. While the 
average per capita income of each region changes over time according to the IPCC scenarios, 
this scenario assumes that income inequalities within each region are preserved over time. 
The second scenario assumes that all inequalities within regions disappear over time, i.e. that 
income equality is reached in the year 2300. Inequalities for the years between 2000 and 2300 
are a linear interpolation between the inequalities of today and perfect equality. The third 
scenario assumes that income inequalities within regions widen over time. All regions reach 
the same level of income inequality in the year 2300 that is the most extreme in the year 2000, 
namely the income inequality of the region ―Small Island States‖. Again, inequalities for each 
region are interpolated linearly for the years between 2000 and 2300. 
While the three scenarios are crude at best, they give a good indication of how sensitive the 
marginal damage figure is to the introduction of an aggregation coefficient. Results for a pure 
rate of time preference of 0% are affected the most by the implausible assumptions made in 
the  three  simple  scenarios.  All  three  scenarios  converge  toward  highly  unlikely  income 
distributions for the year 2300 for each region. With a pure rate of time preference of 0%, 
results in those later years are given the same weight as results from earlier years. Damage 
figures for high pure rates of time preferences suffer a lot less from this defect. Damages in 
later  years  are  discounted  so  much  in  the  first  place  that  implausible  assumptions  about 
inequality development within regions for the later centuries do not have much influence in   23 
the figures for the whole time period. Damages in earlier years, which dominate figures with a 
high pure rate of time preference, are corrected with an aggregation coefficient that is based 
largely on today's income distribution within regions that is based on real data. 
4.5.  Inequality aversion 
Finally,  different  levels  of  inequality  aversion  are  presented  in  Table  6.  Pearce  (2003) 
suggested values between 0.5 to 1.2 for the inequality aversion parameter in the context of 
climate change and those are contrasted with the base line results that were obtained by using 
inequality aversion of 1. 
Since the inequality aversion parameter has effects along the time as well as along the spatial 
dimension  the  results  are  non-linear  in  response  to  an  increase  or  decrease  of  inequality 
aversion.  Depending  on  the  economic  scenario  and  the  pure  rate  of  time  preference, 
sometimes lower inequality aversion parameters even increase the marginal damage figure. 
Various components explain this result: lower inequality aversion will increase the influence 
of economic gains in rich regions. Lower inequality aversion also leads directly to a lower 
discount rate since the expected economic growth over time is given less weight in calculating 
discount factors. 
5.  Discussion and conclusion 
This paper presents equity weighted results that are based on a finer resolution (FUND‘s 16 
regions)  than  previous  publications.  A  sensitivity  analysis  is  conducted  for  sub-model 
resolution income distribution data. This introduction of the aggregation coefficient, and finer 
grid  resolutions  in  general,  are  of  special  importance  in  the  context  of  equity  weighting: 
equity  weights  are  supposed  to  reflect  uneven  income  distributions,  which  by  definition 
cannot  be  captured  when  using  aggregated  values  for  areas  with  highly  diverse  income   24 
inequalities.  Previous  equity  weighted  results
7  have  also  suffered  from  an  inadequate 
combination of the equity weights and a social discount factor. 
While more an issue of presentation, the normalisation method nevertheless appears to be 
important. Marginal damage figures that are normalised with world average marginal utility 
of consumption (Fankhauser, Tol et al. 1997; Pearce, Groom et al. 2003) face the danger of 
being compared to unweighted mitigation costs as if they were of the same unit. The 
likelihood of such confusion is greatly reduced when the social cost of carbon is normalised 
with the marginal utility of consumption of the region, for which the figure is to be used in 
subsequent analysis. Consequently, all equity weighted marginal damages were normalised 
with the marginal utility of consumption of an average US agent in the year 2000 for this 
paper. More generally, equity weighting explicitly assumes a social planner and a welfare 
function. The chosen perspective is crucially important. Different national decision maker s 
would  have  different  perspectives  and  choose  different  equity  weight.  Equity  weights 
therefore do not overcome distributional concerns, or reconcile different position s – equity 
weights merely make such concerns explicit. 
Two areas of uncertainty have also been analysed — the value for inequality aversion and 
income distribution within regions. Results from a sensitivity analysis have been presented for 
both  areas,  they  point  towards  the  importance  of  further  investigation  of  both  matters. 
Particularly,  it  shows  the  importance  of  the  intra-regional  distribution  of  income  and,  by 
implication, climate change impacts; subnational income and impact distribution would be 
important too. At the moment, it is a lack of data that prevents further analysis. 
We here assume that risk aversion and inequality aversion are the same. Separating them is 
straightforward (cf. Fankhauser et al., 1997, 1998). It is more important, however, to improve 
the empirical basis for international inequality aversion. Lange et al. (forthcoming) make a 
useful start.   25 
This  paper  has  also  confirmed  that  equity  weights  significantly  change  the  results  of  the 
calculation of the marginal damage of greenhouse gas emissions, and hence that equity is a 






                                                 
1 Not all utility functions combine the coefficient of risk aversion with the elasticity of marginal utility. Kreps-
Porteus-Selden preferences disentangle the two concepts: see Kreps and Porteus (1978) and Selden (1979). 
2 A finite period is chosen for this paper, mainly for pragmatic reasons: The models used have a finite time 
period, and consumption in the very far future has almost no effect on numerical results, due to the time 
preference factor. 
3 Note that Fankhauser et al. (1997) only compute equity-weighted total damages. 
4 Fankhauser et al. (1997) only talked about regions, average income per region, not individual agents. Since the 
discussion in this paper has so far dealt with individual agents, the formulas have been adapted. 
5 A full list of papers, the source code and a technical description of the model can be found at 
http://www.fnu.zmaw.de/FUND.5679.0.html. 
6 Note that the numbers are very different from the ones reported in Tol (1999). The numbers in Table 3 were 
calculated using the same equity weighting method that was employed in Tol (1999). Other parts of FUND have 
been significantly changed since and explain the discrepancy between the figures in Tol (1999) and Table 3. 
7 With the exception Azar and Sterner (1996). Unfortunately their results are more of academic interest, since 
they use a two region model.   27 
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Figures 
Figure 1: Population 
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Figure 2: Average per capita income 
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Figure 3: Weights for A2 and pure rate of time preference of 0% 
 
   36 
Figure 4: Marginal damage for a pure rate of time preference of 3% with A2 scenario 
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Tables 
Table 1: Unweighted marginal damage in $/tC 
  Pure rate of time preference 
Scenario  0%  1%  3% 
FUND  73.9  15.0  -2.6 
SRES A1b  26.3  3.5  -3.8 
SRES A2  111.5  21.8  -2.4 
SRES B1  13.1  -1.6  -5.3 
SRES B2  69.8  12.7  -3.1   38 
 
 
Table 2: Equity weighted marginal damage in $/tC 
  Pure rate of time preference 
Scenario  0%  1%  3% 
FUND  1,097.3  263.1  -0.7 
SRES A1B  269.4  47.0  -31.6 
SRES A2  1,610.2  350.6  2.5 
SRES B1  163.3  3.4  -45.7 
SRES B2  1,019.4  211.6  -12.7 
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Table 3: Equity weighted marginal damage in $/tC, using the method described in Tol (1999) 
  Pure rate of time preference 
Scenario  0%  1%  3% 
FUND  $73.5  $17.1  -$2.9 
SRES A1B  $26.2  $3.4  -$4.5 
SRES A2  $128.6  $27.6  -$1.9 
SRES B1  $12.2  -$2.3  -$6.6 
SRES B2  $64.9  $12.7  -$2.9 
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Table 4: Results normalised with per capita income of different world regions for scenario A1B in $/tC 
  Pure rate of time preference 
Region of per capita income normalisation  0%  1%  3% 
World average  50.3  8.8  -5.9 
ANZ  157.1  27.4  -18.4 
CAM  21.7  3.8  -2.5 
CAN  187.3  32.7  -21.9 
CHI  19.7  3.4  -2.3 
EEU  23.4  4.1  -2.7 
FSU  15.6  2.7  -1.8 
JPK  354.2  61.9  -41.5 
LAM  27.7  4.8  -3.2 
MAF  10.7  1.9  -1.3 
MDE  18.6  3.3  -2.2 
SAS  4.4  0.8  -0.5 
SEA  15.1  2.6  -1.8 
SIS  8.6  1.5  -1.0 
SSA  3.4  0.6  -0.4 
USA  269.4  47.0  -31.6 
WEU  234.0  40.9  -27.4 
   41 
 
 
Table 5: Equity weighted marginal damage with regional equity coefficient in $/tC (based on SRES A1b 
scenario; normalized at US average income) 
  Pure rate of time preference 
Inequality  0%  1%  3% 
No change  351.9  62.5  -40.0 
More equality  306.7  50.6  -42.5 
Less equality  499.8  96.9  -37.1 
Results without regional equity coefficient 
  269.4  47.0  -31.6 
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Table 6: Equity weighted marginal damage by inequality aversion in $/tC (normalized at US average 
income) 
  Pure rate of time preference 
  0%  1%  3% 
FUND       
ε=1.0  1,097.3  263.1  -0.7 
ε=0.5  1,304.2  263.9  13.6 
ε=1.2  1,146.0  295.7  -9.4 
SRES A1b       
ε=1.0  269.4  47.0  -31.6 
ε=0.5  740.7  153.7  2.8 
ε=1.2  187.7  12.3  -56.3 
SRES A2       
ε=1.0  1,610.2  350.6  2.5 
ε=0.5  1,680.7  312.9  13.3 
ε=1.2  1,731.9  407.2  -2.7 
SRES B1       
ε=1.0  163.3  3.4  -45.7 
ε=0.5  400.0  68.3  -10.7 
ε=1.2  106.7  -29.1  -74.3 
SRES B2       
ε=1.0  1,019.4  211.6  -12.7 
ε=0.5  1,206.6  225.7  6.0 
ε=1.2  1,031.7  223.8  -24.3 
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